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COMPASSION AND COMMANDED LOVE 
Dana Radcliffe 
Biblical evidence suggests that, commanded to love one's neighbor as one-
self, a Christian is required to develop the disposition to feel compassion for 
others and to be motivated by it to caring action. But, should the "Love 
Commandment" also be seen to oblige a Christian to feel compassion as the 
requisite motive to helping behavior in certain specific situations of human 
need? Addressing the familiar Kantian objection that emotions cannot be 
meaningfully commanded because they are not under one's direct voluntary 
control, I draw on recent work by Roberts and Blum and analyze compassion 
as a kind of concern-based construal of a neighbor in distress-a construal 
subject (to some extent) to one's will and therefore a possible object of an 
imperative. I then point out how, on this analysis, "agapeic" compassion differs 
somewhat from other compassion by the Christian's use of "faith-based" 
concepts and beliefs in her construals of neighbors in need. Finally, I respond 
to potential questions about the applicability of the Love Commandment to 
people with limited construal repertoires and about my position's fit with the 
history of the interpretation of Christian love. 
I 
The parable of the Good Samaritan in Luke's Gospel teaches that love of 
neighbor means caring in concrete, practical ways about others in need, even 
strangers one encounters, regardless of differences from oneself. 1 This story, 
which the evangelist attributes to Jesus, is represented as an illustration of 
the love prescribed by the "second great commandment": "You shall love 
your neighbor as yourself' (which I will call the "Love Commandment").2 
Although prior to the nineteenth century this story, like every other Gospel 
parable, was generally interpreted allegorically, it has since come to occupy 
a central place in Christian moral teaching, the Samaritan's active concern 
for the man robbers left for dead being seen as exemplary of agape, the virtue 
commonly referred to as Christian love.3 
This parable, as Luke recounts it, appears to imply that possessing the 
virtue of agape includes being disposed to feel compassion for others in 
distress and to be motivated by it to help. The Greek word used to describe 
the Samaritan's reaction upon seeing the injured man (esplagchnisthe) makes 
it clear that his "compassion" was a sympathetic emotional response to the 
other man's condition, a response which immediately led to action.4 Further 
evidence that the Love Commandment prescribes compassion as one of the 
dispositions, or character traits, that constitute agape is the fact that the 
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Synoptic Gospels often portray Jesus himself as moved by compassion to 
minister to people in need.s The word translated as "had compassion" in these 
texts is the same word used by Luke in the parable of the Good Samaritan; 
again, the term refers to a commiserative emotional reaction to human pain 
and suffering.6 Other New Testament passages, as well, could be cited in 
support of the claim that having the virtue of agape entails being compas-
sionate, where the compassion called for is an affective sensitivity to human 
need that, in appropriate circumstances, gives rise to benevolent acts.7 
Discussions of compassion usually distinguish between compassion as (a) 
a character trait, the disposition to "feel for" others perceived to be in distress 
and to be motivated by that emotional response to try to provide relief, and 
(b) the emotional response itself, the "feeling for" others in need which 
(typically) results in helping actions. In other words, "compassion" can refer 
to a disposition to feel and be motivated by a certain kind of emotion, or it 
can refer to the emotion itself, occurrences of which motivate charac-
teristically "compassionate" acts. Given this distinction, a natural question is 
the following: If the Love Commandment prescribes compassion as a char-
acter trait, then does it also, on specific occasions, prescribe compassion as 
the fitting emotional response to another person's condition of urgent need? 
We are inclined here, I think, to say that the answer must be: "Yes, of 
course." For it seems absurd to think that the Love Commandment would 
require Christians to develop a certain disposition and yet not demand that 
they realize (or actuate) it in particular cases. Consider, for example, the 
attribute of peace, or peaceableness, which is another constituent of the virtue 
agape, in that possessing and acting from neighbor-love entails being dis-
posed to deal peaceably with others, even in confrontational situations. 8 What 
sense could there be in the thought that the Love Commandment requires one 
to be disposed to peaceable dealings with others but does not prescribe, in 
specific cases, that one realize that disposition in one's actual behavior? We 
are thus drawn to infer that the Love Commandment obliges Christians not 
only to acquire compassion as a character trait but also, in certain particular 
situations, to feel compassion for others in need and to act on it to help them. 
There is, however, a well-known objection to allowing that the mandated 
love of neighbor may include an emotional response to him or his condition, 
an objection posed most notably by Kant in Foundations of the Metaphysics 
of Morals. 9 He argues that what is prescribed must involve solely a "deter-
mination of the will" and not "inclinations," among which he counts com-
passion and other emotions. 1o This is how 
... we should understand those passages of Scripture which command us to 
love our neighbor and even our enemy, for love as an inclination cannot be 
commanded. But beneficence from duty, when no inclination implies it and 
even when it is opposed by a natural and unconquerable aversion, is practical 
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love, not pathological love; it resides in the will and not in propensities of 
feeling, in particular principles of action and not in tender sympathy; and it 
alone can be commanded. II 
The same basic point is made by other writers, including some noted biblical 
scholars. Rudolf Bultmann, for example, asserts: 
The command is, you must love; the will is called to action, that is, the man 
is addressed, with the implication that he is placed by God under the necessity 
of decision and must decide through his free act. Only if love is thought of 
as an emotion is it meaningless to command love; the command of love shows 
that love is understood as an attitude of the will. 12 
Thus, emotions are logically excluded from the love which is the object of 
the Love Commandment: Emotional responses are not the kinds of things 
imperatives can meaningfully require. And the reason why this is so is clear 
from the explicit contrast with the will: A logically appropriate object of an 
imperative must be the sort of thing that is under one's voluntary control, and 
emotions (it seems) are not. 
For Kant and many other thinkers influenced by his views, agape is essen-
tially an attitude of unconditional, duty-based respect for each person as a 
human being, apart from his individual qualitiesY Thus, in his book Agape: 
An Ethical Analysis,'4 Gene Outka reviews influential contributions to the 
contemporary literature on Christian love and finds agape generally conceived 
of as something very similar to what Kantians refer to as "respect for persons": 15 
The normative content most often accorded to agape as neighbor-love may 
be stated in summary fashion as follows. Agape is a regard for the neighbor 
which in crucial respects is independent and unalterable. To these features 
there is a corollary: the regard is for every person qua human existent, to be 
distinguished from special traits, actions, etc., which distinguish particular 
personalities from each other. 16 
To describe agape as "independent" regard for another means that it is a 
concern that is unaffected by "changes in the particular state of the other."17 
To characterize it as "unalterable" is to say, in part, that the concern does not 
vary with one's personal reactions to the neighbor or his circumstances. 18 
Rather, through repeated and sustained choices, one commits oneself to 
"equal regard" for every person in virtue of our shared humanity.19 
But. does this analysis of agape entail that the Love Commandment does 
not prescribe compassion, even as a character trait? For what would be the 
point of requiring the disposition but not its realization in particular cases of 
a neighbor in need? Interestingly, Kant maintains that everyone does have a 
duty to acquire the disposition to experience sympathetic feelings for people 
in distress. In The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, he writes: 
But though it is not in itself a duty to feel pity and so likewise to rejoice with 
others, active sympathizing with their lot is a duty. To this end it accordingly 
is an indirect duty to cultivate our natural (sensitive) feelings for others, and 
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to make use of them as so many means for sympathy based on moral princi-
ples and the feeling appropriate to them.2o 
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If one does have an "indirect duty" to produce in oneself a disposition for 
"active sympathizing" with the plight of others in need, how is one supposed 
to bring this about? According to Kant, one must intentionally expose oneself 
to situations of human privation and suffering. 
Thus it is a duty not to avoid places where the poor, who lack the most 
necessary things, are to be found; instead, it is a duty to seek them out. It is 
a duty not to shun sickrooms and prisons and so on in order to avoid the pain 
of compassion, which one may not be able to resist. For this feeling, though 
painful, nevertheless is one of the impulses placed in us by nature for effect-
ing what the representation of duty might not accomplish by itself.21 
Hence, as Kant sees it, every person has a duty to develop one's natural 
"capacity and will to share another's feelings" and to use those sympathetic 
feelings for "furthering an active and rational benevolence"-i.e., fostering 
one's doing beneficent acts motivated by duty.22 
If we extract Kant's claims from the language of eighteenth-century moral 
psychology, we find him making more or less the following argument. On 
occasion one's duty-based regard for others, together with the recognition 
that a certain type of benevolent action is required by duty, is somehow 
insufficient to motivate one to do the prescribed action. In those cases, the 
duty-based regard needs help (so to speak) in the form of other incentives to 
action-particularly emotions, such as compassion-which will combine 
with it to motivate one to do the action duty calls for. However, since emo-
tions are not directly under one's voluntary control, they cannot be summoned 
up at will to give one the additional incentive needed when one's moral regard 
for persons is not enough to motivate the helping action required. Conse-
quently, one has a duty to "cultivate" the dispositions to feel compassion and 
similar emotions so that one will feel them and act on them as the situation 
warrants. In a word, one must train oneself to feel compassion for people in 
need, so that this emotional response will occur spontaneously and, if neces-
sary, combine with one's abstract respect for persons to motivate whatever 
actions duty demands. 
Given that the Love Commandment expresses the fundamental duty of 
Christians in their relations with other human beings, the preceding argu-
ments are readily applied to the case of agape and compassion. Our original 
question was whether the Love Commandment, along with prescribing com-
passion as a character trait, also demands in certain situations that Christians 
feel the emotion of compassion and act on it to render aid to others in need. 
The Kantian answer is 'no,' because emotions, not being under one's volun-
tary control, logically cannot be commanded. Rather, the prescribed neigh-
bor-love is, in the view of many commentators, a voluntary atti tude of respect 
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for persons as human beings-an abstract, unconditional regard which does 
not include one's emotional responses to particular individuals. However, 
since no one's will is completely governed by agape, in some situations of 
neighbor need this duty-based respect is not a strong enough incentive to 
motivate one to do what Christian love requires. On those occasions. the 
emotion of compassion for the neighbor in distress may provide the additional 
incentive necessary to motivate the benevolent acts prescribed. But. because 
compassion is not under one's voluntary control, it cannot be summoned up 
as needed as a motive in such cases. What one can do, though, is work to 
make oneself disposed to feel compassion for people in need, so that the 
requisite emotion will be aroused merely by the sight of another's distress 
and thereby give one an added incentive to do what neighbor-love calls for. 
Consequently, it can be argued that, because of compassion's motivational 
efficacy, the Love Commandment should be seen as obligating one to foster 
this disposition to feel compassion and to act on it as agape directs. Hence, 
although it is not strictly accurate to say that the character trait of compassion 
is a "constituent" of agape if the latter is essentially a general regard for 
persons, the Love Commandment can still be taken to prescribe compassion 
as a character trait which disposes one to experience emotional responses that 
help motivate "agapeic" acts. 
A critical assumption in this line of argument is that compassion, as an 
emotion, is not under one's voluntary control and is therefore not such that 
one can, on a certain occasion, intentionally evoke it in oneself, no matter 
how apt it may be in the situation. But, what if compassion is, to some extent, 
subject to one's will and can, in some instances, be summoned up as an 
incentive to benevolent action? In the first place, Kant's objection that an 
emotion cannot logically be commanded could then be set aside-or, at the 
least, it would have to be substantially modified. Secondly, presumptive co-
gency would return to our initial argument that it would be nonsense for the 
Love Commandment to prescribe a disposition but not its occurrent realiza-
tion in relevant particular cases. In that event, it could reasonably be inferred 
that, to the extent that the emotion of compassion is under one's voluntary 
control, the Love Commandment does in specific situations require one to 
call up that emotion to motivate one to help the neighbor who would be the 
object of the compassion. On the other side, to the extent that compassion is 
not subject to one's will, the Love Commandment is logically blocked from 
prescribing one to feel and act on that emotion in particular situations. The 
key questions, then, are these: (1) Do we have reason to believe that com-
passion is sometimes under one's voluntary control? (2) If one does have 
partial or limited control over this emotion, how does one exercise it? (3) 
What determines the extent of such control? 
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II 
Robert C. Roberts has recently proposed a theory of the nature of emotions 
that enables us to answer (1) in the affirmative and to offer explanations that 
plausibly answer (2) and (3).23 On Roberts' account, emotions are "serious 
concern-based construals"-a construal being "a mental event in which one 
thing is grasped in terms of something else."24 Construing, he says, "seems 
to mean bringing some perceived paradigm, or some concept or image or 
thought, to bear."23 As a simple example, Roberts considers the visual expe-
rience of viewing the "duck-rabbit" figure discussed by Wittgenstein.26 When 
one looks at the drawing, one attends to or dwells on one aspect of it, seeing 
it as a duck (or rather, a duck likeness) or as a rabbit. Thus, in seeing it as a 
duck, say, one brings a concept or an image of a duck to bear (experientially) 
in one's perception of the figure: In short, one construes it as a duck. This 
construal is a characterization of the object itself, the way it appears to the 
viewer, and not an interpretation of a neutral perception: "When I see the 
duck-rabbit as a duck, the figure itself takes on a ducky 100k."27 
Emotions, however, are much more complicated than simple construals like 
seeing an ambiguous drawing as the semblance of a duck. They are construals 
that are "imbued, flavored, colored, drenched, suffused, laden, informed, or 
permeated with concern."28 The word "concern" here refers to "desires and 
aversions, and the attachments and interests from which many of our desires 
and aversions derive."29 Accordingly, 
To be angry is not just to see a person as having culpably offended; it requires 
a concern about some dimension of the offense, and possibly a concern about 
some dimension of the offender. To be afraid of heights is not just to see 
them as a danger to something-or-other; it requires that something I hold dear 
seem threatened.3o 
Moreover, emotions are serious construals, which is to say that they are 
"compelling" or "verisimilar"-that, for the construers, they have "the ap-
pearance of truth," whether or not they are accepted as trueY Thus, one may 
be angry at a small child for smearing catsup on her dress, construing her as 
having culpably offended, even though one does not in fact believe she is 
responsible for her behavior. 32 Furthermore, regarding emotions as serious 
concern-based construals explains how envy, anger, and the like can result in 
characteristic actions. On Roberts' theory, "The concern or concerns on which 
the emotion is 'based' are shaped and focused by the construal into a desire 
for a certain kind of action."33 One who is angry at another construes that 
person as having blamably offended on a point of some concern to oneself. 
This construal naturally generates a desire to do something to assure that he 
receives the punishment one sees him as deserving-a desire which may 
motivate one to try to achieve that end. 
Most important for our purposes, Roberts' construal theory explains how 
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the subject of an emotion is sometimes able to exercise voluntary control over 
it, and sometimes not. The voluntariness of (some) construals is illustrated 
by perceptions of the duck-rabbit figure. A viewer may initially discern only 
one of the aspects, but after seeing both the duck and the rabbit, she can shift 
at will from one construal to the other.34 
Similarly, a person at whom I am tempted to be angry may be regarded, quite 
at will, in various ways: As the scoundrel who did such-and-such to me, as 
the son of my dear friend so-and-so, as a person who, after all, has had a 
pretty rough time of it in life, and so forth. If these construals are all in my 
repertoire, and in addition are not too implausible with respect to the present 
object, then the emotions which correspond to them, of anger, benevolence, 
and pity towards the boy, are also more or less subject to my Will.3S 
Conversely, one may be "blind" to some aspects of the object which are easily 
perceived by others. For a person who is capable of construing the object or 
situation in only one way, that construal will be experienced as involuntary. 
On the other hand, sometimes one can, with effort, come to "see" an aspect 
one was unable to perceive at first, this new construal now striking one as 
compelling.36 
Consequently, one's voluntary control over an emotion consists in one's 
ability to bring to bear different concepts, paradigms, thoughts, or images in 
one's serious concern-based construals of a certain object or situation. The 
extent of such control depends on the richness of one's repertoire of concepts, 
thoughts, etc., potentially applicable to such casesY It seems, for example, 
"that the virtue of courage, which can be thought of as a skill of fear-man-
agement, can be prospered by increasing one's construal repertoire for fear-
some situations. The courageous person has construal options, and thus 
emotional flexibility, that the coward lacks."38 A variety of factors determine 
whether a construal and, hence, the emotion it would yield are in one's 
repertoire. Included among these myriad factors are, Roberts notes, one's 
"habits of attention" and one's "skills at conceptualization and visualiza-
tion"-dispositions one can intentionally enhance, over time, through numer-
ous conscious choices, thereby enlarging one's emotional repertoire. 39 And, 
as the courage example implies, the larger this repertoire, the more voluntary 
control one has over one's emotional responses in particular situations. 
Before the construal theory can be employed in answering questions (1)-
(3), it has to be applied to the case of compassion, an emotion Roberts 
describes as "a form of love," which itself is not an emotion but "a disposition 
to a range of emotions."4o To this end, it will be helpful to draw on Lawrence 
Blum's insightful analysis of compassion and other "altruistic emotions," in 
an article entitled "Compassion"41 and in his book, Friendship, Altruism, and 
Morality.42 In general, the sympathetic or compassionate person, he says, is 
distinguished from other people in two ways: (A) He tends to apprehend 
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situations as involving others' weal and woe, and (B) he is disposed to re-
spond to that apprehending with altruistic acts.43 Elaborating on the former, 
Blum writes: 
The kind, compassionate, sympathetic, or concerned person perceives people 
differently from someone lacking these qualities. The latter, for example, is 
more likely to perceive them in terms of categories relating to their effect on 
his own pleasure or advantage-e.g., as boring, fascinating, obnoxious. 
While the sympathetic person is by no means immune to such categories, 
they will generally playa less central or anyway less exclusive role in his 
'take' on people.44 
Blum gives the point added emphasis by commenting that "[o]ne can say, in 
a Wittgenstein spirit, 'The world of the kind person is different from the world 
of the unkind."'4s As for (B), Blum observes that being thus disposed to 
altruistic acts is simply part of what it means to be sympathetic or compas-
sionate.46 
In his article, Blum focuses on compassion, which he describes as "not a 
simple feeling-state but a complex emotional attitude toward another, char-
acteristically involving imaginative dwelling on the condition of the other 
person, an active regard for his good, a view of him as a fellow human being, 
and emotional responses of a certain degree of intensity."47 Blum's discussion 
takes up in turn each of the four characteristics mentioned in this description. 
(a) One who has compassion "imaginatively reconstructs" the situation of the 
person in distress, trying to represent to herself the experience of the other 
and imagine what it must be like for him in his condition of need.48 (b) 
Compassion includes a genuine concern for the welfare of the one who is 
suffering, a concern which is expressed in an array of caring thoughts, feel-
ings, hopes, and desires directed at his plight. 49 (c) To be compassionate 
entails "a sense of shared humanity," such that one attends to the other's 
similarity to oneself as a human being and thinks of his affliction as the sort 
of thing that could happen to anyone. 50 (d) Compassion involves emotional 
strength sufficient to engender the imaginative reconstruction, the level of 
concern, and the disposition to beneficent action characteristic of this altru-
istic response.S1 
III 
With Blum's conceptual points in hand, we can now make use of Roberts' 
theory of emotions and analyze compassion as a kind of serious concern-
based construal. On the most general level, it may be remarked that to feel 
compassion for another is, in part, to construe his situation in terms of his 
weal and woe-particularly his pressing needs. The emotion of compassion, 
as a construal, is thus an apprehension of the other's circumstances using 
concepts relating to his personal welfare and, especially, threats to it or 
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detractions from it. Moreover, while compassion is a construal of the needy 
condition of a certain person as an individual, it is also a construal of him as 
a fellow human being, one who has the same fundamental needs and desires 
as oneself. To have compassion for him is, in part, to see him as suffering an 
evil to which one is similarly vulnerable as an existing human being. 
The construal that constitutes compassion on a particular occasion is con-
cern-based in that it is "imbued" (suffused, permeated, etc.) with an altruistic 
concern for the good of the person for whom one feels compassion. Upon 
perceiving his need, one experiences various concernful reactions, such as 
fear for his safety, sadness at his loss, hope for relief of his distress, and a 
desire to help if possible. These responses may be partially explained by one's 
general regard for the other as a human being, the basic moral respect most 
people have (at least to some degree) for others as persons. One would thus 
feel fearful, anxious, etc., for any fellow human being perceived to be in acute 
distress-a man seriously injured in a car accident one happens upon, for 
example. But, the experiences that manifest concern for the object of com-
passion are also partly explainable by one's attending to and imaginatively 
dwelling on the specific features of the other person's condition of need. That 
is, one's active concern for the other not only issues from one's basic respect 
for persons but is also in part the result of one's focusing on the particulars 
of his distressful situation and imagining what his suffering must be like. It 
should be added that for such construal-informing concern to be an element 
of compassion in a certain instance, it must be of sufficient intensity to 
motivate one to try to help in some way, given the opportunity. The concern 
that characterizes compassion is not exhausted in mere well-wishing or pass-
ing feelings of sympathetic discomfort but rather is strong enough to galva-
nize one into caring action. 
What makes compassion in a specific situation a serious construal is that 
it is a fairly accurate apprehension of the other person's condition of need: 
The construal is compelling, since the suffering appears to be real-and 
generally, one has no reason to doubt that it is. In fact, the construal becomes 
increasingly compelling the more closely one attends to the situation and 
exercises one's "skills at conceptualization and visualization" in reflecting 
on it. Thus, compassion may be described as "self-sharpening": The emotion 
motivates one to pay even greater attention to the other's condition, and as 
one does so both the fact of the other's suffering and its nature become still 
clearer and more vivid. 
As a serious concern-based construal, compassion in a certain case of need 
is under one's voluntary control to the extent one possesses a repertoire of 
concepts, thoughts, etc., relating to the "weal and woe" of others in general, 
to the humanity they share with oneself, and to the specific kinds of human 
needs presented in this situation. The compassionate person who at first does 
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not happen to feel compassion on a particular occasion when it is warranted 
may be able to summon up the fitting emotional response by using apposite 
concepts, thoughts, etc., in construing the situation and imaginatively dwell-
ing on different aspects of it. Thus, when an emotionally troubled acquain-
tance verbally abuses me over a minor disagreement, I may be able to 
overcome my initial anger and resentment by reminding myself that he is a 
fellow human being and that any of us could fall victim to this sort of 
problem. As I consider his situation, I may well be able to bring myself to 
feel compassion for him as I direct my attention to the anguished state of 
mind that produced the outburst and try to imagine what he is experiencing. 
I may thus succeed in assuaging my anger and replacing it with compassion 
by drawing on my repertoire of construals applicable to such cases as I think 
about his behavior and its possible causes. At the same time, it must be noted 
that one's ability to call up compassion in a certain type of case is also limited 
by one's repertoire of construals potentially applicable to situations of that 
type. A person with a very restricted repertoire of "human need" construals 
consequently has a similarly restricted ability to stir compassion in himself 
for others in need. Indeed, it is conceivable that someone resembling 
Ebenezer Scrooge (prior to his Christmas visitations) might have a repertoire 
of other-regarding construals so meager that he was incapable of feeling 
compassion for another human being, even if in a certain moment he wanted 
to experience that emotion. 
We are now in a position to address questions (1)-(3) explicitly. Regarding 
(1), the preceding discussion shows that there is in fact good reason to think 
compassion is sometimes under one's voluntary control: A strong case can be 
made for conceiving of compassion (in a particular instance) as a serious 
concern-based construal, and such construals are-to some degree-subject 
to one's will. As for question (2), on the construal theory, one exercises one's 
voluntary control over compassion in a certain kind of situation by bringing 
to bear relevant concepts, thoughts, paradigms, and images relating to peo-
ple's general weal and woe, their common humanity, and specific human 
needs. One applies these concepts, etc., in one's construal of the other per-
son's situation of need, as one attends to various aspects of his situation and 
imaginatively reconstructs his experience. By such means, one is sometimes 
able to summon up compassion which then motivates one to perform helping 
actions one would not otherwise have had sufficient incentive to do. The 
answer to question (3) is that the extent of one's voluntary control over 
compassion in a given case is determined by the size of one's repertoire of 
other-regarding or human-welfare concepts, thoughts, etc., which could be 
used in serious construals of situations of that sort. The magnitude of this 
repertoire is in turn influenced by many factors, over some of which one has 
a measure of voluntary control, such as habits of attention (which can be 
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improved over time) and general knowledge of other people's conditions of 
life (which can be expanded over time). The larger one's repertoire of perti-
nent concepts, etc.-in effect, one's repertoire of pertinent construals-the 
greater one's capacity to call up compassion as a motive to benevolent action 
in particular situations of human need. 
If this analysis of compassion as a kind of construal is correct, then an 
affirmative answer can be given to the question raised early in the paper: If 
the Love Commandment prescribes compassion as a character trait, does it 
also in some instances require compassion as an emotional response to an-
other person in need? For it seems that the only circumstance that would bar 
the inference from compassion's being commanded as a character trait to its 
being commanded as an emotion (in some cases) is a lack of voluntary control 
over this emotion. If one can summon up compassion as needed to motivate-
or help motivate-beneficent acts prescribed by the Love Commandment, it 
follows that one is obliged (by the Commandment) to do so on the necessary 
occasions-i.e., those occasions where the emotion is needed as an incentive 
to appropriately caring action.52 
IV 
This conclusion prompts a further question that cannot be adequately treated 
here but which deserves at least the sketch of an answer: Is the emotion of 
compassion prescribed by the Love Commandment the same as that of a 
compassionate person whose values and moral principles are not grounded 
in a religious commitment? Analyzing instances of compassion as serious 
concern-based construals suggests that "agapeic" compassion may in fact be 
somewhat different from "secular" compassion. The reason for this is that the 
compassion required of Christians in some cases of a neighbor in need will 
be shaped by the faith that makes the Love Commandment authoritative in 
their lives. Their repertoires of concepts, thoughts, paradigms, and images 
potentially applicable to diverse situations of people in distress will be sig-
nificantly influenced by their religious beliefs and practices. Thus, while their 
concepts relating to human weal and woe will include many of those con-
tained in the repertoires of compassionate nonbelievers, they will also include 
ones that concern people's spiritual welfare-concepts derived from a view 
of man as "created in God's image" and intended for an eternal relationship 
with Him. Agapeic compassion, then, may be occasioned not only by percep-
tions of physical or emotional need but also by recognition of another's 
condition of spiritual need, such as might be felt by one who has come to see 
life as no more than a pointless race toward death. It is just this sort of need 
to which the Gospel of Matthew seems to be referring when it describes Jesus' 
reaction to the multitude pressing around him, trying to hear his preaching 
and obtain his healing of their afflictions: "When he saw the crowds, he had 
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compassion for them, because they were harassed and helpless, like sheep 
without a shepherd."53 
Furthermore, one who is often motivated to altruistic acts by agapeic com-
passion does conceive of every person as a "fellow human being," a sharer 
in our common humanity. However, his repertoire also includes a number of 
faith-based concepts that he is to use in his construals of others, especially 
in their situations of need-e.g., "child of God," "one loved equally by God," 
"fellow sinner," and "brother for whom Christ died." For a Christian, human 
beings are bound to each other by more than their membership in the same 
species: They are united by the purposes of a loving God, who wills that they 
be reconciled with each other and, ultimately, with Himself. Hence, the duty 
to feel and be motivated by agapeic compassion for others is actually an 
obligation "toward the will of God"-toward "a more transcendent source of 
unity than any discoverable in the natural world."54 
The concern that imbues agapeic compassion is thus generated by sources 
putatively richer and deeper than the anthropocentric beliefs and concepts 
that give rise to the concern pervading secular compassion. The Christian 
who feels compassion for her neighbor construes him as a fellow creature 
whom God loves and for whom the atoning sacrifice of Christ was made. 
But, apparently this is only the beginning, for it seems that the more one's 
perceptions of others and reactions to them are informed by Christian love, 
the more compelling one's appreciation of them becomes, the ideal being a 
God-like caring love for others for their own sakes. Robert M. Adams implies 
that creating a capacity for such love is one of the chief aims of the Love 
Commandment when he writes, 
[God] commands us not only to do good to other people, but to want to do 
it. He commands us to love them. And if (as seems clear) it is they who are 
to be the object of this love, the devotion that is demanded is more than 
obedience. God seeks a response from us that is inspired not only by respect 
for his commands, but by love for what he loves-specifically including our 
neighbours. Inviting us to participate as friends in his projects, he wants us 
to see not only what is important to him, but also to care about it, as he does, 
for its own sake.55 
The conception of compassion I have advanced in this paper shows how 
agapeic compassion, as an emotion sometimes prescribed by the Love Com-
mandment, may function both to motivate particular acts of Christian love 
and to move one toward such caring about one's neighbors purely for their 
own sakes. 
v 
This general account of agapeic compassion no doubt invites a host of other 
questions and possible objections. I want now to address what seem to be 
two of the most serious issues. 
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First, on the view set out here the Love Commandment does not obligate 
a person to feel and be motivated by compassion in a situation of neighbor-
need unless she possesses a sufficiently large repertoire of applicable con-
struals relating to others' welfare and their similarity to herself. But what 
about the person whose other-regarding construal repertoire is not rich 
enough for him to summon up compassion for the neighbor in need? Does 
the Love Commandment thus require less of him than of one who can call 
up compassion in a like situation? If so, then why would anyone want to 
acquire a "sufficiently large" repertoire of such construals? Ostensibly, one 
would have good reason to avoid increasing one's repertoire-and even to 
diminish it, if possible-through willful inattention to others' needs and cul-
tivating the habit of "looking out for number one." The smaller the repertoire, 
the less onerous the weight of the Love Commandment-at least with regard 
to its demanding compassion for imperiled or suffering neighbors. Indeed, 
doesn't my account entail that the Ebenezer Scrooges of the world, precisely 
because of their callousness, are less liable to sin, in the sense of failing to 
fulfill the Love Commandment, than are those who are more sensitive and 
caring of others? Such an implication is hardly compatible with the traditional 
Christian doctrines of sin and sanctification. 
My reply is that, while the Love Commandment cannot require a person to 
feel compassion in a particular situation where he is incapable of evoking it 
in himself, it does not follow that agape demands less of such a person than 
of one who can feel compassion in similar instances of neighbor-need. It is 
a basic tenet of the Christian faith that "the two great commandments" apply 
to everyone who embraces that faith, but exactly what the commandments 
require depends on the specific circumstances and the believer's individual 
capabilities.56 As I pointed out at the beginning of the paper, biblical evidence 
indicates that the Love Commandment directs Christians to become compas-
sionate, to develop a disposition to feel compassion and be moved by it to 
help others in distress. Thus, assume a set of possible situations of a neighbor 
in need Sl. .. Sn, and two Christians: Theophilus, who is able to feel compas-
sion sufficient to motivate appropriately beneficent action in Sl...Sn, and 
Narcissus, who lacks that ability due to the poverty of his repertoire of 
other-regarding construals. It seems right to say that the Love Commandment 
requires different things of Theophilus and Narcissus relative to Sl. .. Sn, with 
the former obligated to feel and act out of compassion in those casesS7 and 
the latter obligated to acquire the capacity for agapeic compassion Theophilus 
already possesses. In an important sense, the Love Commandment requires more 
of Narcissus, rather than less, because he, unlike Theophilus, is obligated to 
change his character, to become a different sort of person than he is now.S8 
But, it might be argued, can't a similar objection be raised about the Love 
Commandment's requiring people who are unable now to feel compassion to 
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develop that capacity in the future? Such development would entail one's 
significantly increasing one's repertoire of relevant construals, but don't in-
dividuals vary considerably in their ability to expand their repertoires? Per-
haps some people are just not able to enlarge their repertoires enough to 
become capable of feeling and being motivated by compassion. If so, the 
Love Commandment cannot demand that they acquire that capacity. 
I would respond, however, that obtaining a suitably ample repertoire of 
other-regarding construals is surely within the power-over time-of nearly 
all adults, excepting only the most emotionally dysfunctional. In the first 
place, each person's experience will have produced numerous "human need" 
construals she frequently applies to herself at least. Second, almost all of us 
are capable, with effort, of applying those construals to other people as well. 
For a Scrooge or a Narcissus, it will be necessary for him intentionally to 
effect constructive changes in some of the factors that determine the size of 
his other-regarding construal repertoire: habits of attention, skills at concep-
tualization and visualization, general knowledge of other people's conditions, 
etc. More specifically, then, it seems indisputable that developing a repertoire 
of construals that can be used in summoning up agapeic compassion is within 
the power of virtually every Christian serious about trying to fulfill the Love 
Commandment in his life. In fact, growing as a Christian necessarily involves 
enlarging one's store of other-regarding-andespecially, faith-based-con-
struals. Both through her reflection on Christian teaching (including teaching 
about God's own compassion for the lost) and through her relationships with 
other Christians, the committed disciple gains an increasing appreciation of 
others as her "neighbors" and a heightened sensitivity to their needs.59 And 
it is clear from the history and current life of Christian communities that even 
the "simple believer" (to use Kierkegaard's term) can experience such growth 
and become deeply compassionate in obedience to the Love Commandment. 
A second important issue facing my proposed conception of agapeic com-
passion is this: In claiming that Christians may sometimes be required to feel 
(motivating) compassion for others, am I discounting nearly two thousand 
years of interpretation of agape and the Love Commandment?60 If so, lowe 
readers an explanation of how centuries of exegesis could have been mis-
taken. 
As Dutka's survey makes evident, the Kantian view that Christian love of 
neighbor involves the will alone, and not emotions, is common in the twen-
tieth-century literature on agape.6\ However, although it has been widely 
accepted and has had a number of prominent defenders, this account is by no 
means a consensus interpretation, either historically or among contemporary 
biblical scholars and theologians. In the first place, most commentators now 
recognize that a conceptual polarity between will and emotions is almost 
entirely absent from the Bible itself.62 "Biblical language with reference to 
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man is functional and practical," and both the Old and New Testaments tend 
to "treat personality as an unanalyzed unity, with no interest along philosophi-
cal lines."63 Thus, from the concrete, prephilosophical perspective of the 
biblical texts, God's commands are addressed to the whole of a man's per-
sonality, the unitary source of both obedience and disobedience to His will.64 
It was Augustine who eventually "invented" the abstract notion of the will 
as the human capacity for free choice-"in order to clarify which part of the 
human personality is concerned with freedom, sin, and divine grace."65 For 
Augustine, the will is moved by various emotions, including compassion ("a 
fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we 
can"66), but the will alone is the subject of moral praise or blame, and so, of 
moral imperatives.67 While the emotions to which a person is "subject" can, 
to some extent, be deliberately cultivated (or "educated"), in any particular 
situation they are "simply 'there,' given, and what matters morally speaking 
is not what they are, but what a man decides to do: to yield to them, restrain 
them, encourage them, which to select to follow in action."68 Hence, while a 
Christian confronting a neighbor in need may well feel compassion for him-
especially if her emotions have been properly cultivated-the Love Com-
mandment can require no more than a voluntary movement of the will leading 
to benevolent action, where such movement may involve merely allowing 
herself to be motivated by compassion she happens to feel on that occasion.69 
Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, affirmed that mercy ("heartfelt com-
passion for another's misery") is sometimes commanded as a motivating 
"effect" of charity (caritas)-love of God and love of one's neighbor for 
God's sake-but that such compassion is not an emotion.70 On his view, every 
virtue aims at some good as its object or end, and the object of charity is 
divine good, i.e., one's enjoyment of God, a good grasped only through the 
intellect; accordingly, the seat of charity is the intellective appetite, which, 
for Aquinas, is also the wilpl However, charity for a neighbor, even an 
enemy, is more than simply good will for him, including as well an "affective 
union" with him based on one's imaginatively identifying with him in his 
distress.72 Such is the case when, in a certain situation, what the Love Com-
mandment requires, and charity (as the efficient cause) produces, is mercy-
"a movement of the intellective appetite when one grieves at the sight of 
another's misfortune."73 Although this obligatory mercy, or compassion, is a 
kind of sadness or pain over another person's plight, it is nevertheless not an 
emotion, since it is a movement of the intellective-rather than the sensi-
tive-appetite.74 
For John Calvin, "duties of charity," such as almsgiving, "are not fulfilled 
by the mere discharge of them, though none be omitted, unless it is done from 
a pure feeling of 10ve."75 "Christians," he said, "should put themselves in the 
place of him whom they see in need of their assistance, and pity his misfor-
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tune as if they felt and bore it, so that a feeling of pity and humanity should 
incline them to assist him just as they would themselves."76 Thus, Calvin, 
like Aquinas, held that Christian love of neighbor in some instances demands 
that one identify with the neighbor in need and thereby be moved with 
affective concern to come to his aid. But, unlike Aquinas, Calvin gave no 
indication that he thought this requisite "feeling of pity and humanity" is not 
an emotion-or even that it is a special kind of emotion in being subject (at 
least partially) to voluntary control. Rather, he seems to have regarded it as 
an ordinary emotional response intentionally induced by what Blum calls an 
"imaginative reconstruction" of the other person's condition of need. 
Kant, of course, ruled out altogether the possibility that the Love Com-
mandment ever requires compassion or pity in a particular situation-pre-
cisely because he believed such a response to a neighbor in need is in fact 
an emotion. To be sure, Kant's view has been influential down to the present, 
serving as a point of reference for most of the best-known treatments of 
neighbor-love as a motive to beneficent action. A number of these discus-
sions, however, have included a rejection of Kant's position. Thus, Emil 
Brunner, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr, among others, have argued that 
Kant's notion of Christian love is unduly narrow and that excluding emotional 
elements from agape misrepresents it as detached and bloodless. 77 According 
to Brunner, for example, just as God's caring for us is not merely respect, 
but love, "[w]hoever through faith has a share in His will does not merely 
respect his neighbour, he loves him, and the characteristic sign of love, 
compared with the rational attitude of respect is ... sympathy, the purified form 
of the experience of feeling the other person as a 'bit of myself."'78 No more 
a passive quality than is faith itself, such love "through faith and with faith, 
is at the same time always a demand. But when Kant emphasizes-and from 
his rational premisses perfectly rightly-that it is ridiculous to demand a 
feeling, so also from the premisses of faith it is equally natural to demand 
this jeeling .... "79 Unfortunately, none of these theologians has been able to 
go beyond repudiating Kant's account of commanded neighbor-love to ex-
plain, apart from appealing to the mystery of faith, how an emotional reaction 
to a person in need can be voluntary and thus a possible object of the Love 
Commandment. 
It should be apparent from these observations that the history of Christian 
thought has yielded no standard interpretation of agape relative to the ques-
tion of whether the Love Commandment may obligate one to feel compassion 
as a motive to helping one's neighbor. What we do find is a longstanding 
tension between two opposed and stubbornly persistent intuitions: that agape 
sometimes requires Christians to be moved by compassion to care for neigh-
bors in need, and that emotions, including compassion, cannot logically be 
commanded. My analysis of agapeic compassion offers a coherent and plau-
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sible way of resolving this tension. It provides a credible theoretical basis for 
the view of Aquinas, Calvin, and Brunner that Christian love may on occasion 
demand that one act out of compassion for another person-without endors-
ing Aquinas' paradoxical claim that such compassion is not an emotion. Yet, 
it also answers the concern of Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant that emotions 
cannot be commanded, by showing how compassion, as a serious concern-
based construal, is to some extent under one's voluntary control. Moreover, 
the account I have defended does not entail imposing on New Testament 
discussions of agape and compassion a textually unsupportable dichotomy 
between the will and emotions. Rather, it makes a case for the intelligibility 
of thinking of the Love Commandment, as the earliest Christians did, as being 
addressed to one's personality as a whole. so 
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